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Why	the	Alternative	Vote	system	could	have	delivered
a	clearer	signal	on	Brexit
The	confusing	scramble	by	Remainers	to	vote	tactically	in	this	General	Election	has	exposed	the	failings	of	the	First
Past	the	Post	(FPTP)	system.	Tarun	Khaitan	(Oxford	University)	explains	why	the	Alternative	Vote	system	could
have	delivered	a	clearer	signal	about	Brexit	–	particularly	as	it	would	have	discouraged	Labour	from	engaging	in
strategic	ambiguity	about	it,	and	forced	voters	to	deliberate	on	Plan	B	if	their	preferred	option	was	not	to	be	realised.
What	do	the	British	people	want	to	do	with	Brexit?	Anyone	hoping	to	find	answers	in	the	results	of	tomorrow’s
elections	is	likely	to	be	disappointed.	Only	a	clear	majority	in	vote	share	(rather	than	simply	seat	share)	for	the
Conservatives	can	possibly	be	read	as	a	mandate	for	Brexit;	likewise,	only	a	vote	share	majority	for	the	explicitly
anti-Brexit	parties	(the	Liberal	Democrats,	Greens	and	others)	could	indicate	a	mandate	against	it.	Since	no
credible	pollster	considers	either	of	these	outcomes	to	be	within	the	realms	of	possibility,	and	Labour	voters	are
hard	to	read	because	the	party	is	sitting	on	the	fence,	it	is	unlikely	that	we	will	know	what	the	British	people	really
want	to	do	about	Brexit	on	Friday	morning.	In	this	post,	I	will	consider	which	electoral	system	would	have	produced
the	most	faithful	representation	of	what	the	people	want.	I	will	be	assuming	that	although	Brexit	is	not	the	only	issue
in	this	campaign,	it	is	clearly	the	most	important	one	and	would	largely	determine	the	voting	behaviour	for	most
people.
Deciding	Brexit	through	FPTP
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The	power	to	deliver,	delay,	modify,	or	stop	Brexit,	on	the	other	hand,	will	be	determined	by	the	relative	seat-shares
of	parties,	which—in	the	existing	first-past-the-post	system	(FPTP)—will	likely	reflect	an	over-translated	(relative	to
vote-share)	seat-share	of	the	winning	party.	By	doing	so,	FPTP	clearly	accrues	a	significant	democratic	deficit.
Proponents	of	FPTP	claim	that	this	is	a	price	worth	paying	precisely	because	it	over-translates	the	votes	of	the
winning	party	into	seats.	It	is	said	to	deliver	stable	governments	and	to	exert	a	defragmenting	centripetal	force	in
the	political	system	by	penalising	smaller	parties	and	rewarding	larger	ones.	It	is	said	to	be	especially	hostile	to
parties	that	behave	like	factions,	and	try	to	polarise	the	electorate	by	targeting	a	scapegoat	minority.
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However,	FPTP	exerts	this	centripetal	force	under	very	specific	circumstances	—	a	unitary	state	with	a	relatively
homogenous	population	and	a	two-party	system.	Because	it	relies	on	single	member	constituencies,	it	penalises
factions	only	if	social	groups	are	geographically	dispersed.	In	federal	states	with	geographically	concentrated	ethnic
and	cultural	minorities,	FPTP	results	in	a	multi-party	system	with	a	large	number	of	ethnicity-based	or	region-
specific	parties	whose	political	influence	is	concentrated	in	their	particular	regions.	India	is	a	good	example	of	a
federal	system	with	a	heterogenous	population	and	geographically	concentrated	sub-national	groups.	In	India,
FPTP	has	resulted	in	numerous	factional	parties	—	so	while	it	continues	to	exercise	a	centripetal	force	in	each
state,	and	restricts	the	number	of	serious	contenders	to	two	or	three	parties,	the	frontrunners	are	different	in
different	states.	As	regional	parties	like	the	Scottish	National	Party,	Plaid	Cymru,	and	Sinn	Fein	gain	strength	in
specific	regions	of	the	UK,	the	only	parties	that	continue	to	be	penalised	by	FPTP’s	centripetalism	are	the	smaller
parties	with	a	dispersed	support	base,	such	as	the	Greens,	UKIP,	and	the	Liberal	Democrats.	While	this	may	be
welcome	to	some	people,	the	complete	exclusion	from	power	of	a	party	like	UKIP	is	more	likely	to	make	it	want	to
seek	political	possibilities	outside	the	system.	It	shouldn’t	surprise	us	that	parties	that	are	always	likely	to	fail	in	a
system	will	want	to	change	it,	sometimes	radically.	Whatever	its	merits	might	have	been	20	years	ago,	FPTP	today
simply	inflicts	costs	on	UK	democracy	without	delivering	its	supposed	centripetal	benefits.
Parties	and	voters	know	the	democratic	deficit	in	FPTP	and	have	been	openly	trying	to	game	it.	The	scale	of	overt
attempts	to	figure	out	the	best	strategy	for	contesting	and	voting	in	these	elections	has	been	unprecedented.	Given
the	complexity	of	the	system,	and	the	unreliability	of	opinion	polls,	the	ability	of	the	voters	to	successfully	game	the
system	is	extremely	limited.	Disgust	with	being	forced	to	play	these	strategic	games	when	performing	one’s	most
fundamental	civic	duty,	and	frustration	with	the	lack	of	information	that	would	permit	gaming	with	confidence,	has
led	to	renewed	calls	for	a	shift	to	a	proportional	representation	system.	Proportional	systems,	however,	are	no
panacea	either.
PR	is	also	problematic
Under	a	proportional	system,	a	small	political	party	which	only	seeks	a	measure	of	political	influence	(which	can	be
substantial	if	it	holds	the	balance	of	power	in	a	coalition	government)	may	be	content	with	winning	(say)	10%	of	the
legislative	seats.	Under	a	pure	proportional	system,	it	would	need	10%	of	votes	to	do	so.	This	may	be	relatively
easy	to	achieve,	in	many	contexts,	by	running	a	polarising	campaign	against	a	hated	ethnocultural	minority.	In	fact,
it	may	even	be	easier	for	a	small	party	to	secure	10%	of	the	vote	share	through	a	distinctive	polarising	campaign
than	by	competing	with	broad-church	larger	parties.	Proportional	systems,	therefore,	exert	a	centrifugal	force	on	the
polity.	So,	while	a	Brexit-focussed	election	under	PR	rules	would	have	permitted	the	voters	to	register	their
preference	regarding	Brexit	directly	without	needing	to	game	the	system,	it	is	likely	that	smaller	parties	would	have
been	tempted	(even	more)	to	jostle	for	political	distinction	by	employing	divisive	and	polarising	rhetoric.	The	polity
then	needs	to	fix	increasingly	higher	vote	share	thresholds	that	a	small	party	must	win	to	qualify	for	legislative	seats
—	thereby	replicating	(albeit	to	a	lesser	degree)	the	democratic	deficit	of	the	FPTP	system	that	it	was	supposed	to
fix	in	the	first	place.
At	any	rate,	given	Labour’s	ambiguous	position,	it	is	unlikely	that	running	this	election	under	PR	rules	would	have
delivered	a	clear	verdict	on	Brexit.	Even	if	(say)	the	clearly	pro-Brexit	parties	won	45%	of	the	vote-share	(and	seat-
share)	and	the	anti-Brexit	parties	won	30%,	Labour’s	25%	of	seats	would	have	been	decisive	in	determining	the
way	forward.	While	voters	don’t	need	to	(and	typically	can’t)	game	the	system	in	a	pure	PR	regime,	they	can	have
little	idea	what	the	resulting	post-election	coalition	government’s	policy	is	going	to	be.	For	all	its	supposed
democratic	merits,	PR	scores	low	on	the	accountability	of	parties	to	their	voters	with	regard	to	their	manifesto
commitments.	Remember	Nick	Clegg?	Another	democratic	problem	with	PR	is	that	it	can	vest	a	very	small	party
with	the	balance	of	power	—	the	Theresa	May	government	being	held	hostage	by	the	DUP	is	likely	to	become	a
very	frequent	scenario	under	a	PR	system.
An	AV	system	could	have	been	the	best	of	both	worlds
UK	voters	rejected	a	move	to	the	Alternative	Vote	(AV,	also	known	as	Preferential	Vote	or	Ranked-Choice	Vote)	in
a	referendum	in	2011.	That	was	a	mistake.	If	the	current	election	was	being	conducted	under	an	AV	system,	no
voter	would	have	been	required	to	game	the	system.
An	anti-Brexit	voter	would	have	ranked	her	preferred	anti-Brexit	party	as	her	first	choice,	perhaps	another	anti-
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Brexit	party	as	her	second	choice,	an	ambiguous	or	soft-Brexit	party	as	her	third	choice,	and	so	on,	marking
the	staunchest	hard-Brexit	party	as	her	least	preferred	option.
A	pro-hard-Brexit	voter,	on	the	other	hand,	could	have	done	the	same	in	reverse.
All	voters	would	have	needed	to	deliberate	on	their	second	preference—not	necessarily	something	they	liked,
but	an	outcome	they	could	tolerate.	This	could	reduce	tribalism	in	politics.
A	voter	who	is	indifferent	to	Brexit	would	have	decided	her	rankings	based	on	their	policies	in	relation	to	the
issues	that	mattered	most	to	her.
Furthermore,	strategic	ambiguity	would	have	been	a	less	attractive	option	for	Labour.	Benjamin	Reilly’s	research	on
the	Australian	experience	shows	that	AV	affects	smaller	parties	differently	from	FPTP.	The	latter	system	denies
smaller	parties	with	a	dispersed	base	both	power	and	influence.	Under	AV,	parties	like	the	Greens	are	able	to
advise	their	voters	on	which	larger	party	to	put	down	as	their	second	preference	in	return	for	policy	deals	reached
with	such	parties.	So	Labour	would	have	had	to	enter	into	some	form	of	pre-election	deal	with	the	Greens	(and,
possibly,	even	the	SNP	and	the	Liberal	Democrats)	to	secure	their	voters’	second	preference.	To	do	so,	they	may
have	had	to	get	off	the	fence.	Since	the	deals	are	struck	before	the	election,	voters	know	exactly	what	they	are
voting	for,	and	are	in	any	case	able	to	ignore	their	preferred	party’s	advice	regarding	their	second	preference	vote.
In	addition,	AV	distinguishes	between	factional	smaller	parties	like	UKIP	and	non-factional	small	parties	like	the
Greens:	while	the	Greens	could	equally	figure	on	any	rank	for	a	voter,	voters	are	likely	to	treat	UKIP	like	Marmite.
Some	would	love	it	and	mark	their	first	preference	against	it;	for	others,	it	is	likely	to	be	the	over-my-dead-body
option.	AV	therefore	rewards	broad	church	parties	and	penalises	factions,	unlike	PR,	which	rewards	factionalism	at
the	margins	of	the	polity.	AV’s	centripetalism,	however,	is	more	democratic	than	FPTP’s	—	it	assesses	not	only	the
voter’s	preference,	but	also	the	intensity	of	her	preference	and	dispreference.	Deals	between	parties	are	typically
made	before	elections,	and	are	therefore	subject	to	electoral	accountability	ex	ante.	Also,	while	AV	also	keeps
factional	parties	out	of	power,	unlike	FPTP	it	keeps	them	within	the	electoral	fold	and	gives	them	a	stake	—	albeit	a
small	one	—	in	the	system.
Admittedly,	AV	is	harder	to	explain	and	administer	than	some	of	the	alternatives,	but	tweaks	such	as	limited	and
optional	rankings	(which	permit	—	rather	than	mandate	—	voters	to	rank	their	top	two	or	three	candidates)	can
make	the	system	feasible.	The	right	to	rank	one’s	top	three	choices	is	very	intuitive	to	most	people.	AV	has	the
greatest	ability	to	avoid	making	gaming	demands	on	voters,	and	thereby	avoid	is	delegitimising	effects	on
democratic	politics.
How	this	election	would	have	turned	out	under	AV	is	anyone’s	guess.	But	voters	would	not	have	felt	compelled	to
vote	for	reasons	other	than	their	partisan	preferences,	and	could	have	felt	fairly	confident	that	parties	would	not
renege	on	their	key	election	promises	in	post-electoral	coalitions.	For	a	system	under	siege,	that	could	only	have
been	a	good	thing.
This	blog	post	draws	upon	his	draft	paper	on	Political	Parties	in	Constitutional	Theory,	and	from	comments	by	Prof
Kim	Lane	Scheppele	and	Prof	Benjamin	Reilly.	It	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit
blog,	nor	LSE.
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